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William 0. Douglas - His Work in
Policing Bankruptcy Proceedings
John W. Hopkirk*
Professor Hopkirk here undertakes a study of the contributions and
theories of Justice William 0. Douglas in the field of bankruptcy and
corporate reorganization. The author derives the basic theories of
Douglas in the bankruptcy field through an analysis of his work on the
SEC Protective Committee Study of bankruptcy law, as Chairman of
the SEC, and as justice on the United States Supreme Court. He
concludes that Douglas throughout his career manifested a continuity
of approach to bankruptcy problems emphasizing functional analysis.

William 0. Douglas, while associated with the Securities and
Exchange Commission during the mid-nineteen thirties, was responsible for a study of methods and procedures of corporate reorganization. By examining this area of Douglas' work, we can compare the
position on corporate reorganization which the Justice developed as an
administrative official for the New Deal with his later consideration
of the same problems as a member of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Through this comparison we can observe a number of
basic attitudes which were manifested by Douglas both before and
since he has joined the Court. Important among these are his
philosophy of individual self-reliance and his thorough commitment
to the functional approach in analyzing legal problems.
Douglas' self-reliant individualism is a philosophy which he has
long extended beyond the personal arena, emphasizing the moral
responsibility of individuals in dealing with social, economic, and
political problems. This theme, suggested in much of Douglas'
autobiographical writing,1 was applied to the economic sphere in a
speech made by Douglas during his period as Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The disappearance of free enterprise has submerged the individual in the
impersonal corporation. And when a nation of shopkeepers is transformed
into a nation of clerks enormous spiritual sacrifices are made. Communities
everywhere lose men of stature and independence. Man loses opportunities
to develop his personality and his capacities. He is denied a chance to stand
Associate Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania Military College.
1. DorLs, Or MEN AND MoUNAN S 210-11 (1950).

This aspect of Douglas'

attitudes is also discussed by the writer in W. 0. Douglas, Individualist (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1958).
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on his own before man and God. He is subservient to others and his thinking
is done for him from afar. His opportunities to become a leader, to grow in
stature, to be independent in mind and spirit, are greatly reduced. Widespread submergence of the individual in a corporation has as insidious 2 an
effect on democracy as has his submergence in the state in other lands.

Examination of Douglas' work in the field of corporate reorganization
not only shows us something of this viewpoint in operation, but also
portrays social problems which undoubtedly served to intensify
Douglas' feeling of the importance of personal ethical responsibility
in dealing with corporate finance.
A second basic element, Douglas' thorough commitment to the
functional approach in analyzing legal problems, often has been
referred to as "legal realism." Douglas, early in his career, argued
for a functional approach which he believed would focus attention
on the economic and social forces involved in litigation over business
affairs.
[Concentration on functions] would lead rather to a consideration of the
phenomena observed in the organization and operation of a business than of
the mere form itself of business. That would result in observations of the
things men attempt to do and are found doing when engaging in business.
That would lead to the emphasis being placed on the end sought ...
That would shift the emphasis from forms of business units to the uses to
which the units are put. That would discard at one sweep the theological
refinements of the concepts. Instead of having his mind cluttered up with
many analytical distinctions (oftimes metaphysical) the student would start
with considerations more fundamental. The process would be concerned
almost solely with the incidents of economic, social, and business problems;
with a consideration of the social controls over such economic, social, and
business forces; with the results of such controls. Around such incidents
3
would the legal and non-legal material be grouped.

A corollary to his use of the functional approach is Douglas' ability
to plunge into a morass of complicated materials, sort them into a
pattern, and prescribe a course of action. Judge Charles E. Clark,
Dean of the Yale Law School during much of Douglas' tenure as a
professor there, characterized the Justice as being "a horse for work,"
a man who could be depended on to expeditiously complete work of
almost any magnitude.4
2. DoucLrAs, DEMOCRACY AND FINANcE, 15-16 (1940).
3. Douglas, A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations, 23 ILL. L.

REv. 673, 675-76 (1929).

The writer examines Douglas' development as a legal

functionalist more fully in The Influence of Legal Realism on William 0. Douglas,
in EssAYs oN THE AmmucAN CoNsTrrunoN 59-76 (1964).
4. Interview With Judge Clark, New Haven, Conn., June 10, 1953.
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I. How DOUGLAS CAME To BE RECRUITED To HEAD THE SEC
PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE STUDY

Interest in the functional study of business law had led Douglas in
the late twenties to embark on an extensive study of the administration of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Douglas expressed his concern
functionally as follows:
The present Act was passed in 1898 and, though amended several times,
has never been changed fundamentally. During the thirty-three years it has
been in force no inventory . .. has been made . . . to determine its incidences. . . . The only data available are those contained in the annual

reports of the attorney-general. They are practically valueless for even an
administrative, let alone a functional, study of bankruptcy. They reveal
little of the kinds of persons using bankruptcy. No clues are given as to
why they are there. No information is set forth showing what treatment they
obtain-whether they applied for a discharge, whether the application was
contested, whether the discharge was granted or refused and if refused on
what ground. Nothing is given showing how the various subdivisions of
the discharge section [14 (b)] are working.5
From both a personal and a scholarly standpoint, Douglas' timing

in embarking on bankruptcy studies could not have been better; the
events of 1929 furnished increasing quantities of material for study
and spawned numerous governmental investigations. Douglas' views
of bankruptcy problems were sought by individuals as highly placed
as Solicitor-General Thomas D. Thacher, who was conducting an
investigation at the behest of President Hoover into "the whole
question of bankruptcy law and practice." 6 Interest in the topic of
the bankruptcy study became so great that a popular magazine published the gist of Douglas' discoveries as to causes of bankruptcy,
titling its report "Have You the Right to Be in Business?" 7
Meanwhile Congress had been exploring questionable practices in
the realm of corporate finance, the hearings having since been widely
known by the name of the committee's chief counsel, Ferdinand
Pecora. One outcome of those hearings was a decision to have the
SEC conduct further investigation of the role of security holders'
protective committees in reorganization proceedings. The mandate
for this investigation was written into section 211 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
5. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329, 330-31
(1932). See also Clark, Douglas & Thomas, The Business Failures Project-A Problem
in Methodology, 39 YAx L.J. 1013 (1930); Douglas & Thomas, The Business Failures
Project-anAnalysis of Methods of Investigation, 40 YA.x L.J. 1034 (1931).
6. Message Recommending the Strengthening of Procedures in the Judicial System,
together with the Report of the Attorney-General on Bankruptcy Law and Practice,
S. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1932).

7. Wieshart, American Magazine August, 1930, p. 26.
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The [Securities and Exchange] Commission is authorized and directed to
make a study and investigation of the work, activities, personnel, and functions of protective and reorganization committees in connection with the
reorganization, readjustment, rehabilitation, liquidation, or consolidation of
persons and properties and to report the result of its studies and investigations and its recommendations to the Congress on or before January 3, 1936.8

As Joseph Kennedy and James Landis, Chairman and member of the
new commission, were looking for someone to carry out the protective
committee study, Douglas happened to be publishing a recent phase

of his studies, a discussion of the role of protective committees in
railroad reorganizations.9 Although Kennedy and Landis reportedly
had little or no personal acquaintance with Douglas,

°

his accomplish-

ments were enough to make them feel he was the man they needed
for the job.
Douglas' approach must have seemed a reasonable one to a New
Dealer. Protective committees had a useful role to play but required

reform and regulation. As Douglas had written from his vantage
point at Yale:
The need for increased regulation has not been due primarily to the incompetency or to the fraudulent proclivities of committee members. Rather,
the need has arisen because so often the committees have been constituted
by the inside groups, those affiliated with or drawn from the old management or the financial interests associated with it. Often the interests of
these members have been dearly those of speculative equity groups, not
motivated solely or dominantly by the urge to protect the interests of the
securities which they represent.'1
IL

ORGANIZATION

AND

APPROACH OF THE PROTECTIVE

COMMarT E STUDY

Around him on the Protective Committee staff Bill Douglas gathered
a small group of bright young men, many of them recent Yale Law
8. 48 Stat. 909 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 78(b) (1958). A definition may be in order
here for those unfamiliar with the apparatus of corporate reorganization. Protective
or reorganization committees are committees set up ostensibly to represent the interests
of a particular class of security holders during negotiations directed towards a reorganization of the financial structure of a concern. Although such negotiations most
commonly occur during the bankruptcy or receivership of a corporate debtor, they
may be commenced in order to forestall arrival at such dire financial straits.
9. Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad Reorganizations, 47 Hnyv. L. REv.
565 (1934).
10. Bill and Billy, Time Oct. 11, 1937, pp. 61, 64. Douglas was appointed by
Kennedy July 16, 1934, to be head of the Department of Reorganization, which position
carried with it responsibility for all matters affecting corporate reorganizations and
related problems. N.Y. Times July 17, 1934, p. 29.
11. Douglas, supra note 9, at 567. As we consider his work further it will be
interesting to note the extent to which his SEC investigation consists in spelling out
at length these same views.
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School graduates. Since this group was small, organization of the
study could remain quite informal. The cohesion and spirit of the
staff greatly simplified its task. According to one of the major participants, the principal organizational problem may well have been adaptation to government red tape, since virtually all lacked significant
2
experience in Washington.'
Douglas was closely involved in direction of this investigation for
several years. In the early stages he continued to teach at Yale,
commuting back and forth to his classes, while in the later years of
report-writing he increasingly had to divert his attention to the
broader problems facing a member and chairman of the SEC. His
imprint is extensive throughout the eight volumes of the SEC final
report. In fact, he wrote a considerable portion of the report's 4,048
pages himself. Samuel 0. Clark, Abe Fortas, and a few others
prepared other parts of the first drafts, but the boss went over all of
them subsequently. He gave particular attention to important sections
such as those embodying the summaries and conclusions of the different volumes. 13 For these reasons the report is useful as an indication
of Douglas' attitudes on the problem of corporate reorganization
procedures.
Shortly after the SEC study group was organized, it settled down
to the basic fact-finding task. The scope set for the project indicates
the thoroughness of Douglas' grounding in fact-oriented research.
Questionnaires were sent out to obtain basic data from recently reorganized companies, from protective committees, and from those serving
12. Interview With Samuel Ohrman Clark, Jr., Washington, D.C., June 18, 1953.
Altogether there were no more than a handful of assistants on the project. Clark,
chief counsel for the study, stated that all who participated in the work (except for
secretarial assistants) are listed in the letters transmitting various parts of the study
to Congress. Others besides Clark so mentioned include: Abe Fortas, Samuel H. Levy,
Martin Riger, George H. Dession, R. B. Ainsworth, Philip Blacklow, F. A. Doolittle,
J. Q. Newton, Jr., Frandis F. Lincoln, Roger Foster, E. J. Fruchtman, J. P. Goode.
Several of these individuals participated only in work on one or two sections of the
report.
13. Interview With S. 0. Clark, Jr. The various parts of the report and the
sequence in which they were prepared give an indication of the magnitude of the
investigation and the manner in which the group approached its task. SEC REPorT ON
TnE STUDY AND INvESTIGATiON OF THE Woim, AcrrvrriEs, PEnsoNNL AND FuNCTIONs
OF PRoTEtrivE AND REoRaGAiZAroN CoM-Nrrs: pt. IV, Committees for the Holders

of Municipal and Quasi-Municipal Obligations (April 30, 1936); pt. III, Committees
for the Holders of Real Estate Bonds (June 3, 1936); pt. VI, Trustees Under Indentures
(June 18, 1936); pt. I, Strategy and Techniques of Protective and Reorganization
Committees (May 10, 1937); pt. V, Committees and Agencies for Holders of Defaulted
Foreign Government Bonds (May 14, 1937); pt. II, Committees and Conflicts of
Interest (June 21, 1937); pt. VII, Management Plans Without Aid of Committees
(May 10, 1938); pt. VIII, A Summary of the Law Pertaining to Equity and Bankruptcy Reorganizations and of the Commission's Conclusions and Recommendations
(September 30, 1940) [hereinafter cited as REPonT oN PROtTECFE Coem.].
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as trustees for debentures. Hearings were then started which went
on month after month. 14 As they moved on to oral examination,
Douglas frequently conducted the interrogation of witnesses personally. One after another a long procession of corporation officials,
bankers, investment underwriters and their attorneys passed through
the hearing room. Frequently Douglas uncovered evidence of a
single-minded pursuit of gain in the course of which those investigated
appeared to have abandoned the fiduciary obligations of trustees, the
duty of corporation officials to stockholders' interests, and the ethical
standards of conduct supposedly adhered to by members of the bar.
While Douglas had had some prior intimation of these lapses gained
from his brief, early work in the Wall Street law firm of Cravath,
de Gersdoff, Swaine & Wood, from his previous study of reorganization, and from prior investigation of these same matters by others,
apparently he was surprised to find
such extensive evidence as was
5
uncovered in this investigation.'
The SEC group attacked the problem from the broad, functional
approach that had become so typical of Douglas. In Douglas' view
it was impossible to comprehend the reorganization process without
a knowledge of the law involved, but complete understanding often
demanded that legal cloaks be stripped away.
A study of reorganizations ....

entails an examination of the objectives of

reorganization both in theory and in practice. It also involves consideration
of the strategy and techniques which have been employed to reach those
objectives. These can best be understood and appreciated if they are
divested of their legal garb. It is in such manner that these matters are
dealt with in this part of our report.' 6

Douglas began the process of considering reorganization techniques
14. The bulk of the oral evidence appears to have been gleaned from the following
individual investigations by the Protective Committee Staff. In a number of these
cases prior work, such as that of the Pecora Committee, had pointed the way to
Douglas" sleuths. The hearings included: Proceedings Before the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the Matter Of: Associated Gas and Elec. Co. (1935); The
Baldwin Locomotive Works (1935); Bondholders Protective Comm. for the Republic
of El Salvador (1935); Celotex Co. (1935); Cuba Cane Sugar Corp. (1935); Federal
Public Service Corp. (1935); Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., (1935); R.
Hoe and Co., Inc. (1935); Institute of International Finance (1935); Kreuger & Toll
Co. (1935); McLellan Stores Co. (1935); ParamountPublix Corp. (1935); Protective
Comm. for Bondholders of the City of Asbury Park, New Jersey, and other Municipallties and Public Instrumentalities (1935); Protective Committees for Bondholders of the
City of Coral Cables, Florida (1935); Readjustment of External Obligations and Protective Committees and of Protective Organizationsfor Security Holders of the Republic
of Peru (1935). Transcripts of the hearings in these cases are on file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C.
15. Interview with Samuel 0. Clark, Jr.
16. 1 RIEPorT ON IROTEcnVE Comm. 2.
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"divested from their legal garb" by setting forth the differing positions
from which the general investor and the "insider" frequently approached reorganizations. There is little difficulty in telling on which
side Douglas' Calvinistic background placed him. The problems are
clearly stated on the second page of the general report in language
bearing the Douglas imprint.
Reorganizers and investors will at times have different objects in reorgani-

zations. Investors will be interested in an expeditious, economical, fair, and
honest readjustment of their company's affairs. They will be concerned
with having the business restored to an efficient and trustworthy management as quickly as possible, so that they may the sooner have dividend or
interest payments on their investments resumed. They will be interested
in suffering the least possible impairment of their investment whether by
reduction in interest or principal or by loss of security. They will want fair
treatment accorded them by those whose claims are senior and junior to their
own. They will be desirous of keeping reorganization costs at a minimum.
They will be concerned with the cancellation of burdensome contracts and
with the collection of all assets of the company, whether these assets be in
the form of claims against their officers, directors, and bankers for mismanagement and the like, or otherwise. They will be desirous of having
the company which emerges from the reorganization adequately financed.
They will want that company to have a sound financial structure, so that
there will be no immediate necessity for another receivership or bankruptcy,
sometimes referred to as an "expensive luxury at best." If their company
has been a preserve for exploitation, they will want to be rid of the
despoilers. They will want an extravagant, wasteful, inefficient, or faithless
management ousted from control and a new one installed. In other words,
before the new venture is started they will want a complete accounting of
the old; they will consider that no reorganization is complete unless there is
such an accounting. From the investors' point of view no reorganization
adhered to these objectives
could be thoroughgoing unless the reorganizers
17
of expedition, economy, fairness, and honesty.

In actual practice the best that is attainable ordinarily falls considerably short of perfection. So it is with even the best of reorganizations. To prevent loss of large sums in legal fees and court expenses,
maximum recovery for the interests of a given class of security holders
may have to be sacrificed to a speedier settlement of the reorganization. Often if any losses are to be recouped from future earnings
the business must be kept going. In such cases the debenture holders
may have to make condessions to the stockholders of a corporation
and forego their rights to an immediate foreclosure of the business
lest they then find themselves faced with no alternative but piecemeal
sale of its assets at a fraction of their value. Thus it is that discretionary acts and decisions play a large role in the accomplishment of any
reorganization.
17. 1 REPonT

ON

PnoTm

=

Comvm. 2-3.
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With the entry of discretionary judgment an evaluation by objective criteria of the extent to which representatives have adequately
fulfilled their trust becomes impossible. The opportunity for what
George Washington Plunkitt called "honest graft" insinuates itself
into the situation. In such circumstances only the sense of loyalty
which a representative feels for those for whom he acts can assure
adherence to high standards of fiduciary responsibility. Such loyalty
in turn requires a disinterested passion for the interests he guards.
The Protective Committee Study found that too frequently the
greatest flaw in the reorganization techniques of the day was lack of
this disinterested spirit:
Reorganizers have at times had objectives not only different from but

incompatible with those of investors. Reorganizers have frequently been
interested in expeditious reorganizations not primarily to avoid expense, not
necessarily because of the desire to have dividend and interest payments
quickly resumed, but largely because of their desire to consummate a reorganization of their own liking. Reorganizers frequently have not been
concerned, in the manner of investors, with economy in reorganization, as
economy would interfere with their profits. Reorganizers at times have not

been interested in fair reorganizations, since fairness might seriously
intrude into their own plans and affairs. Reorganizers at times have not
desired honest reorganizations, in the investors' sense of the word, because
such reorganizations would be costly to them. They have been motivated
by other factors. And they have endeavored-in large measure with success
-to mould the reorganization processes so as to serve their own objectives. 18

A. Reorganization Strategy-the Stakes Involved
As the study progressed Douglas and his associates spelled out more
and more the extent to which the negotiations and techniques of
those who participated in reorganizations might be directed towards
controlling the reorganization itself and the business units which
would emerge from the reorganization. The reorganization of the
Celotex interests provided one example of this struggle.
Celotex, founded and built up for the most part by Bror G. Dalhlberg, had fallen upon less prosperous days and was in receivership.
Dahlberg's leadership was being seriously threatened by a powerful
group of security holders who attributed the company's difficulties
to Dahlberg's mismanagement of its affairs. At this juncture Dahlberg
joined forces with Walter S. Mack, Wallace Groves, and William B.
Nichols. Mack was an officer in a concern devoted to industrial management and reorganization work, and in two investment trusts related
to it. -

Together the group set up the Central Securities Company through
18. 1 REPORT

ON PROTECTnvE

Co m. 4.

1965]

]WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

which Dahlberg was to have a part interest in the reorganization and
a place in the new company. Control was to pass to the Phoenix
Security Corporation, the other owner of Central Securities. Groves
was president of Phoenix and held 300,000 shares of its stock; Mack
was vice-president and held 6,400 shares; William B. Nichols & Co.
owned 4,400 shares.' 9 Mack was also a vice-president of Nichols
&Co.
Groves and Dahlberg then established a reorganization committee
for Celotex. Its chairman: William B. Nichols. Nichols & Co. was
to provide reorganization services to the committee at a fee of 2,500
20
dollars per month plus special compensation for Nichols himself.
Eventually the reorganization committee presented to the security
holders a plan of reorganization which it received ready-made from
the hands of Dahlberg, Mack, and Groves. By compromising with
the demands of one of the more vociferous security holders the
promoters gained control of this company.
The Douglas study was understandably critical of this reorganization.
Very definitely, this was not an activity which was designed to aid investors
whose moneys were tied up in the prostrate Celotex Company. On the
contrary, this outside group did not hesitate to use and abuse the protective
committee machinery and to buy up securities at depressed prices to promote their own fortunes. Against the financial resources, composed largely

of other people's money, the strategic advantages and the ruthlessness of
this group, investors in this company were helpless. Such a group obviously

has objectives different from those of investors. It is engaged in a purely
entrepreneurial venture, for profit. Especially is its activity dangerous in

light of the power which it has against unorganized, weak security holders.
And especially dangerous and vicious are its incursions likely to be when
it screens them behind a protective committee which invites unsuspecting

and unwarned investors to entrust their securities to it. Such a group
through the devices of a protective committee invites investors to further

its selfish and undisclosed schemes with startling ruthlessness.2 1

Obviously men do not engage in struggles for the financial control
of reorganizations and reorganized companies without a reason. The
Douglas group documented some of the numerous and substantial
sources of financial reward for such efforts. One example was the underwriting of new securities issues in the Celotex reorganization. Central Securities took the underwriting commitment for 75,000 shares of
new common stock. It undertook to purchase at a price of $6.66 a
share any part of its stock commitment not subscribed for by the
19. 1 REPoRT oN PRoTECTivE Comm. 102.
20. 1 REPORT ON PRoTEc= Comm. 106.
21. 1 REPOaRT oN PROTECrIV

COMm. 136.
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stockholders. The total sum it could have been obligated for under
this arrangement was approximately half a million dollars. 22 Actually
it was "required" to supply only 72,218 dollars. With the stock selling
at the time at about twelve dollars a share, it realized a profit of
57,905 dollars on its commitment. In return for this "risk" of underwriting, and for the advance of some other sums which the group had
to spend anyway in order to gain control of the company, Central
Securities was given a compensation of 25,000 shares, securities worth
300,000 dollars. As a further compensation it received an option to
purchase 50,000 additional shares at $6.66 a share, a chance for an
additional 267,000 dollars profit. Thus, neglecting the advances made
by Central Securities, which were to finance gaining control of the
company, the group made an immediate unrealized profit of 624,905
dollars on its underwriting obligation of 499,500 dollars, of which
obligation it actually supplied 72,218 dollars. The stock rapidly rose
in price. When listed on the New York Stock Exchange a month and
a half later it was selling at about twenty dollars a share. In November 1936, a year later, the price ranged from 27,8 to 33%. At thirty
dollars a share the underwriting was worth 2,170,091 dollars.23
The Douglas investigation highlighted many other advantages
obtainable by insiders controlling reorganizations. There were all
manner of supplies and professional services which such groups could
contract to furnish the debtor. They could take steps to enrich
themselves by acts which altered the prices of the debtor's securities.
The management could cover up wrongdoing which might make
privileged groups liable to suit for recovery of wasted or wrongfully
dispersed assets or for damages. Friendly trust companies could earn
lucrative fees for their services as depositaries for the securities of
protective committee members. The opportunity to provide such
services, requiring little more than honest but routine clerical work,
was often insisted upon by a bank before its officers would consent to
participate in a reorganization. 24
Douglas and his fellow investigators directed one of their most
22. 1 REPORT oN PROTECTIVE Com-m. 129.
23. Profit figures are tabulated in 1 REPORT ON PROTECTIVE Cosar. 134-35. Stock
prices are given in 1 REPORT ON PROTECTIVE CoMm. 130.
24. 1 REPORT ON PROTECTIVE COIM. 168ff.

Eagerness to obtain the business is easily understood if one notes the sums dispersed
to depositaries in a few reorganizations. American Bond and Mortgage had paid, up to
March, 1933, $332,355.61. 1 REPORT ON PROTECTIVE Comm. 169. Ninety seven committees in Strauss-controlled real estate reorganizations paid the Strauss National Bank
and Trust Co. more than $495,500. 1 REPORT ON PROTECTrvE Comi. 170. Detroit,
Michigan, municipal securities committees paid three banks $474,704.30. In the
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P.R.R. reorganization depositaries were paid $817,755.41.
1 REPORT ON PROTECTIVE CoMMx
%r. 179. Part I of the Report details these and other
questionable practices at length.
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scathing attacks at members of their own profession who by pyramidig the costs of reorganization ate still further into the assets of the
bankrupt. In the investigators' minds the crime was further compounded by the fact that these same lawyers at times were responsible
for the original dissipation of the assets. The general report indicted
the reorganization bar as follows:
The depression with its consequent wave of security defaults presented the
legal profession with an unsurpassed opportunity to render genuine public
service in the rehabilitation of corporate enterprises in the interests of
investors. Yet, though there are, of course, exceptions, the profession by and
large has not evidenced a desire to promote reorganization expeditiously
economically, and solely in the interests of investors. On the contrary, it
has evidenced ability and ingenuity in furthering the interests of those who
utilize the reorganization processes to serve selfish ends ...
We are particularly concerned with the shift of the reorganization bar
from standards of professional service to those of pecuniary gain. In its
avarice for reorganization fees the legal profession by and large has forsaken the traditions of officers of the court and has become highly entrepreneurial in nature. Furthermore . . . members of the reorganization bar
have not been reluctant to occupy inconsistent positions, and under the
guise of disinterested service to the estate, to act as the faithful servant of
interests hostile to the investors.2

Douglas was not unaware of the fact that legal services in reorganizations were often of great importance and that they could take many
hours of a finn's time. He had his own experience as a young associate
in Cravath, de Gersdoff, Swaine, & Wood to draw upon.26 That
experience may also have suggested to him what his group declared
might be the root of the difficulty.
The vice of the situation remains despite persuasive arguments that
particular jobs are well done. The vice is that the bar has been charging all
that the traffic will bear. It has forsaken the tradition that its members
are officers of the court and should request and expect only modest fees.
This condition has prevailed to an extent throughout the profession. And
it is not a new development; it is a practice of long standing. But it has
been accentuated in the case of the financial bar, which has been dominant
in reorganizations. Part of this unseemly tendency of the financial bar to
demand huge fees may be due to the business cast of law practice of that
kind. Part may be due to overspecialization in financial centers with large
law offices composed of dozens of lawyers, a huge overhead, and consequent
25. 1 REPORT O" PNomc= COMm. 212-13.
26. "My bankruptcy practice was short-lived. But what it lacked in duration it
compensated for in size however, for I helped to prepare a two and a half million
dollar proof of claim and a half a million dollar reclamation petition in the G. L.
Miller bankruptcy and filed both a few minutes before the time for filing expired."
Douglas, Address, 3 REF. J. 48 (1929). Douglas was an associate of the Cravath
firm from September 15, 1925, to January 28, 1926, and again from October 1, 1926,
to June 30, 1927. 2 SwAIn,, Thz CnAvAT Fnuvi at xv (1948).
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artificial standards of the worth of legal services. In other words, organization for the practice of law on the large scale of mass production has
contributed to the alleged necessity of computing legal fees on an overhead
rather than a service basis. Part may be due to the fact that the practice
of financial law has been to a great extent monopolized by relatively few
firms. This has meant setting monopolistic prices on the legal services of
the select financial bar. But whatever may have been the cause, the end
result has been that more conservative and modest professional standards
have been discarded.27

B. Reorganization Strategy-The Techniques Employed
The usefulness to insiders of control of a debtor company and of
the procedures of reorganization has already been illustrated in part.
It is through this control-control over the manner in which proceedings are conducted, control over the actions of indenture trustees, and
control over the selection and approval of reorganization committeesthat insiders further their own purposes.
Control over proceedings was important if inside groups were to
carry out their plans. If a corporation was thrown into bankruptcy
by unfriendly creditors there was always the possibility that the
management would lose out to independent trustees. Therefore it was
important for the controlling group to beat others to the courts.
In their study of the R. Hoe & Co. receivership, the Douglas investigators documented the length to which groups would go in striving
to attain friendly receiverships. The company was faced by a suit in
the state courts for appointment of a receiver after it had voted to
default on interest payments. Hoe's lawyers advised that steps be
taken to have a federal receiver appointed since this would facilitate
continuance of inside control. Under federal law such action was
possible, however, only if suit was commenced by an out-of-state
creditor with claims exceeding 3,000 dollars. Only two creditors
approximated these requirements. One, a competitor, was thought to
be ipso facto undesirable as an agent in such proceedings. The other,
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, held claims of less than 3,000
dollars and, in addition, refused to be a party to such an undertaking.
It did agree to assign its claim, however. Hoe then moved to increase
its debts to Jones & Laughlin and arranged to have the enlarged claim
assigned to a New Jersey resident, one Christian, prospective son-inlaw of Hoe's president. Hoe then had its English subsidiary cable
Christian the funds necessary to purchase the Jones & Laughlin claim.
Thus the transaction would not appear on its own books. Next the
company's lawyers obtained independent counsel for Christian, handing them the documents necessary for the contemplated action.
27. 1

REPORT ON PROTECTmvE

Coimm. 215-16.

1965 ]

WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

Christian, by now somewhat bewildered but anxious to please his
apparently without
father-in-law-to-be, signed the necessary papers,
28
great understanding of what was going on.
Control of indenture trustees was also of importance to those who
sought painless reorganization. Frequently, when a corporation borrows funds through flotation of securities an elaborate agreement is
drawn up appointing a trustee, ordinarily a banking corporation, to
police the rights of holders of the securities concerned. As with the
long-established attitude of the reorganization bar, testimony brought
out in the Protective Committee hearings revealed that trustees set
up under these indentures had gradually come to observe only minimum standards for their fiduciary role.
In the investigation of the reorganization of the Baldwin Locomotive
Works the Douglas group unearthed an example of what this could
mean. The indenture securing the first mortgage bond issue of the
company provided that "the unencumbered quick assets of the
Corporation . . . shall at all times equal or exceed the aggregate
indebtedness of the Corporation. . . ." It provided, as a duty on
Baldwin's part, for periodic delivery to the trustee of a schedule
"showing in general and summarized form, the nature, description
and value of the quick assets of the Corporation on hand at the date
of the close of said fiscal year; and the description and amount of
the aggregate indebtedness of the Corporation at said date."
These explicit provisions were, according to the investigators,
"continually violated by the company." They discovered that although
Baldwin's statements to the trustees clearly failed to conform to the
requirements of the indentures, conduct tantamount to default, the
trustee took no action until the corporation itself had publicly announced its default in payment of the principal or interest. 9 The
trust officer for the trustee told the Douglas group that this practice
of ignoring the existence of indenture violations, based on fairly
typical clauses exempting the trustee from obligation to act unless
demanded by holders of twenty-five per cent (in value) of the trust
issue, was a general one.
The seriousness of such behavior as a possible detriment to the
interests of the lone security holder seemed clear. Typically such an
investor has never seen the indenture, a complex and lengthy legal
document. Frequently he has not the time or the money to police
the behavior of his debtor and must rely on the trustee. In such cases
as the one cited, however, while the trustee ignores failure of the
28. For an account of this see 1 REPORT ON PROTECTIVE Co mn. 250ff and material
there cited. This particular type of behavior became unnecessary after the passage of
section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1934, 43 Stat. 912 (1934).

29. 6 REPORT ON PRoTEcU
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debtor to fulfill conditions of the loan, the funds from which the
security holders might be paid may be largely dissipated.
Control over committee machinery has also been discussed in part.
If a committee has members possessing the special interests held by
Nichols in the Celotex reorganization, it is not hard to see what the
advantages could be to insiders. Such groups always faced the threat
that independent interests might attempt to organize for their own
protection, however.
The Douglas group found certain tried and true techniques
available for discouraging organization by independent outsiders. Insiders will know in advance of financial difficulties which may lead
to default, enabling them to organize committees and get them into
the field ahead of any competing groups. 30 Either the company or
its investment bankers have access to the lists of the security holders of the corporation. The study indicated that it was a frequent
practice to refuse access to these lists to all except members of the
inside group. Without such a list, a competing committee found
much greater obstacles involved in attempting to contact security
holders, present them with information concerning the company's
31
affairs, and mobilize them for independent action.
The committee investigation staff believed that the independent
security holder frequently is poorly equipped to judge for himself
the wisdom of a proposed course of action. Under such circumstances,
the management of the reorganizing corporation possesses a distinct
persuasive advantage in regard to reorganization plans to which it
chooses to give its stamp of approval. A prominent banking house
32
enlisted on the side of management can wield similar influence.
All manner of devices were frequently employed to persuade
security holders to deposit their securities with a protective committee.
First in the field, the management committee typically was able to
obtain a high percentage of deposits. Deposit agreements, the study
revealed, typically contained provisions giving almost complete
authority to the committee and granting the privilege of withdrawal
of deposited securities only on payment of a substantial penalty.
Thus, once the management group had fastened its grip on the
independent investor it was difficult for him to escape.

III. SEC CHr mnAN

DOUGLAS IMPLEMENTS BANKRUPTCY

REFORMS

Through elaboration of such material Douglas' Protective Committee Study drew a picture which pointed up sharply the inadequacies
30. 1 REPORT ON PRoT aIVE Commx . 388-408.

31. 1 REFORT ON Paomcn
Comem. 408-57.
32. 1 REPORT ON PRoTECVE Coaf.
458-78.
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which he felt to be present in existing corporate reorganization procedures. The Securities and Exchange Commission then immediately
drew up proposals to eliminate such practices through remedial legislation. This was natural because Congress had intended the study to
serve as a guide to needed legislation. The vigor with which the SEC
pushed its recommendations is not surprising either, for Douglas
himself became a Commissioner in January 1936, and Chairman in
September 1937.
The easiest way to measure the success which Douglas experienced
in getting his recommendations adopted is to look at some of the
SEC-sponsored provisions in two laws, chapter X of the (Chandler)
Bankruptcy Act of 193833 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.4
A. Chapter X of the Chandler Bankruptcy Act of 1938
No statutory authorization had existed for federal courts to participate in reorganizations of corporations (as distinguished from authority
over bankruptcy proceedings in which the estate of a corporate debtor
would be liquidated) prior to addition of sections 77A and 77B to
the Bankruptcy Act in 1934.3 Section 77B began a process of federal
control of reorganizations at approximately the same time that the
Douglas group began its study. As a result, some amelioration of
conditions in reorganizations had already taken place. Douglas and
his associates felt, however, that numerous improvements still were
required.
When originally passed, section 77B was regarded as a piece of
emergency legislation. 36 As the depression continued extensive use
revealed its faults but simultaneously demonstrated its usefulness.
Meanwhile, studies such as the Thacher investigation, Douglas' bankruptcy studies at Yale, and the activities of other academicians and
practitioners in the field had produced a growing feeling of need for
general revision of the bankruptcy laws. In 1932 such dissidents
formed the National Bankruptcy Conference, an informal organization
devoted to the writing of thorough-going amendments to the bankruptcy laws. 37 Extensive hearings were held by the House Judiciary
Subcommittee headed by Representative Chandler.
As the work of all these groups was nearing completion, the
33. 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 112 (1958).
34. 53 Stat 1140 (1939).
35. 48 Stat. 912 (1934).
36. Hearings Before the Committee on the Revision of the Bankruptcy Act of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Doc. No. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937).
37. Hearings Before the Committee on the Revision of the Bankruptcy Act of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Doc. No. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1937).
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Douglas reports began to flow to Congress. Representative Chandler
requested the Douglas group to meet with representatives of the
National Bankruptcy Congress and iron out such differences as they
might have concerning the proposed legislation. In the course of
this work the revision of 77B, chapter X of the Chandler Act, became
a vehicle for enactment of many of Douglas' views on corporate
reorganization.8 The congressional hearings reveal through Douglas'
own testimony the features of the new chapter X which he regarded
as of central importance. In only a few instances does it appear that
Douglas failed to place in the law provisions in conformity with the
position of his Commission.3 9
A number of provisions served to decrease greatly the potentially
undesirable control of management over corporate reorganizations. A
key factor in achieving this was the independent trustee, one of the
major requirements Douglas felt necessaiy for the elimination of
dishonesty.4 ° The Chandler Act required that in all cases where the
debtor's liquidated liabilities exceeded 250,000 dollars the judge must
appoint an independent trustee to administer the affairs of the
debtor.41 In addition, in the reorganization proceedings this trustee
was to be represented only by a disinterested attorney. 42 The trustee
could investigate the conduct of the business. He had the legal
duty of reporting any evidence of "fraud, misconduct, mismanagement, and irregularities,"4 3 and was to prepare a report on the financial
condition of the business for creditors, stockholders, and other interested persons. 44 In addition to this the trustee was given the
responsibility for drawing up a plan of reorganization which would
protect the legitimate interests of all those holding claims on the
debtor's assets.4 5
38. Douglas told the Senate Committee holding hearings on the bill, "Our recommendations as respects 77 (b) are contained in Chapter X of H.R. 8046." Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Revision of the National
Bankruptcy Act of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Doc. No. 8046, 75th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 10 (1938).
39. See Douglas' testimony, Hearings Before the Committee on the Revision of the
Bankruptcy Act of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Doc. No. 8046, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 162ff (1937). Also see the exchange between Jacob Weinstein and
members of the committee, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Revision of the
National Bankruptcy Act of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Doe. No.
8046, 75th Cong., 2nd Sess. 132 (1938).
40. Hearings Before the Subcommittee an the Revision of the National Bankruptcy
Act of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Doc. No. 8046, 75th Cong., 2d
Sess. 164 (1938). Many of the reforms outlined in the following pages follow almost
verbatim recommendations in 1 REPORT oN PRoTEcTiVE CormNun 898-902.
41. 52 Stat. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1958).

42. 52 Stat. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 157,8 (1958).
43. 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1958).
44. 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1958).
45. 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1958).
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A second major feature of the law's scheme for assuring the establishment of a practical and fair scheme of reorganization was the
provision for intervention of the SEC whenever the estate's liabilities
exceeded 3,000,000 dollars (discretionary power existed in the case
of lesser indebtedness). If the Securities and Exchange Commission
so desired, it could then report its views on their merits. The Comalso could appear in a role
mission, under certain circumstances,
46
analogous to that of amicus curiae.
So that the interests of those participating in the proceedings might
be known, the law required disclosure of the terms of agreements
under which those appearing acted, of their own claims and security
holdings, as well as those of persons they represented, and of the time
when these interests were acquired.47 The judge was granted broad
authority to disallow undesirable provisions in proxy and deposit
agreements, to restrain exercise of those "unfair or not consistent with
public policy," and to limit claims or stock acquired in contemplation
of the reorganization proceedings "to the actual consideration" paid
48
for them.
Still further measures were taken to lessen the opportunity for
speculative gain or excessive profits from services in reorganization,
so that participation would be less eagerly sought by others than bona
fide holders of claims and securities. Awards for services were to
be limited to "reasonable compensation and reimbursement for proper
costs and expenses." 49 Persons seeking compensation, moreover, were
to file with the court, under oath, a statement showing any trading
done in the securities or claims of the debtor after the commencement
of proceedings under chapter X. The new law provided that:
No compensation or reimbursement shall be allowed to any committee
or attorney, or other person acting in the proceedings in a representative
or fiduciary capacity, who at any time after assuming to act in such capacity
has purchased or sold such claims or stock, or by whom or for whose account

such claims or stock have, without the prior consent or subsequent approval
of the judge, been otherwise acquired or transferred5

Chapter X further provided that while the debtor, indenture trustees,
and any creditor or stockholder might be heard as of right on any
matter coming before the court, in addition "the judge may, for cause
shown, permit a labor union or employees' association, representative
46. 52 Stat. 890, 91, 94 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 571, 72, 608 (1958).
47. 52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 610, 11, (1958).
48. These provisions are also contained in 77B, 48 Stat. 912, 915 (1934).
49. 52 Stat. 900 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 641 (1958). Again, 77B had contained
similar provisions, compensation for services rendered was to be "reasonable," reimbursement was to be for "actual and necessary expenses." 48 Stat. 912, 917 (1934).
50. 52 Stat. 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1958).
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of employees of the debtor, to be heard on the economic soundness
of the plan affecting the interests of the employees." 51 This provision
had been foreshadowed by some of Douglas' suggestions in the early
stages of the Yale Business Failures Project almost ten years before.
In 1930 he had argued that although workers "do not have an investment in the business in the legal or popular sense," they possessed a
"prospective income" from it which gave them a status in the enterprise with "a measurable degree of permanency." Douglas had then
argued that a court not only should take into consideration the welfare
of the employees as well as the creditors and stockholders, but that
in the year 1930 it might also find relevant the state of the labor
market generally at the time. Basing his premise upon the functional
approach to corporate reorganization, Douglas had argued that:
A liquidation which would cause an immediate displacement of labor with
little chance of an early absorption of the displaced labor might argue for
such attempt [to rehabilitate the business or to sell it as a going concern]
if the interests of
even though it would not be deemed good judgment
52
creditors and stockholders alone were considered.

B. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939
A further portion of the Douglas reform program became law with
the passage of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. 53 Sponsored by Senator

Barkley, it had been drawn up by the SEC5 in consultation with
bankers, insurance companies, and others interested in the problem.
An amendment to the Securities Act, this law provided for registration with the SEC of all indentures whose issuance and sale depended
in any way on use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce.
Any indenture under which securities were issued would be valid
only if the Commission found it conformed to certain requirements.
SEC supervision was intended to ensure compliance with various
provisions of the law designed (1) to keep the trustee disinterested,

(2) to prevent him from acting for more than one securities issue of
a given corporation, and (3) to make him liable for failure to watch
carefully over the interests he had undertaken to guard.
51. 52 Stat. 894 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 606 (1958).
52. Douglas & Weir, Equity Receiverships in the U.S. District Court for Connecticut:
1920-1929, 4 CoNr. B.J. 1, 9 (1930). During the House hearings on the relevant
provision in chapter X, Representative Michener, a Michigan Republican, was strongly
critical of this provision and questioned Douglas sharply. Douglas replied at one point
that this "is not a great revolutionary step but only a recognition of what enlightened
judges have occasionally done." Hearings Before the Committee on the Revision of
the Bankruptcy Act of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Doc. No. 8046,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1937).
53. 53 Stat. 1140 (1939).
54. Hearings Before the Committee on Trust Indentures of the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce H.R. Doc. 10292, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 16 (1938).
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IV.

REACTION TO THE PROTETIVE COMMITrEE STUDY

Reactions to the Protective Committee Study and to its proposed
reforms were mixed. Examination of the special series of eulogies

printed in the Journal of the National Association of Referees in
Bankruptcy5 5 on the occasion of the passage of the Chandler Act
makes it clear that the SEC-sponsored provisions of chapter X were
recognized as novel and experimental. The American Bar Association
Committee on Commercial Law and Bankruptcy had opposed the
proposal for a disinterested trustee.s Henry H. Heimann, Executive
Manager of the National Association of Retail Credit Men, recognized
the divergence of views on chapter X but felt there was:
no doubt ... that the basic philosophy of the chapter, which is by no
means inconsistent with the traditional philosophy of bankruptcy law in
this country, and which is designed to give creditors and investors a more
active part in reorganization proceedings, should be beneficial. 57

John Gerdes, a bankruptcy practitioner and professor of law at New
York University, singled out the SEC reforms for particular attention.

He was somewhat less optimistic than Heimann.
That these and other innovations are sincerely designed to meet recognized
abuses and deficiencies in reorganization practice as it existed under § 77 B
and under the equity receivership, may not be doubted. With their purpose of affording independent investors a larger measure of protection, and
with their effort to furnish the smaller creditors and stockholders with fuller
information concerning the proceedings and the manner in which their
interests are to be affected, no one can quarrel. But opinions can and do
differ as to whether the devices which have been adopted will prove
workable and completely satisfactory from a practical standpoint and as to
the extent to which the delay and expense resulting from the added steps
in the procedure may offset the benefits which might otherwise result.
Not without foundation is the fear that at least some of these changes will
produce serious disadvantages of their own.58
Jacob M. Lashley, a member of the Board of Governors, felt that

such provisions as that for making lists of security holders available
to interested parties through the courts would "meet with satisfaction
among the members of the bar and other interested persons who have
found difficulty in submitting plans and other information to creditors . . . ."59 He thought that the provisions for intervention of the
SEC could only be evaluated with the passage of time. However,
55. 12 REF. J. 133-37 (1938).
56. Id. at 137.
57. Id. at 134.
58. Id.at 135.
59. Id. at 133.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VeOL. 18

when he turned to the assumptions behind some of the other SEC
reforms, Lashley adopted a different tone.
But the procedure adopted, in some respects presupposes a greater degree of
sinister motives upon the part of stockholder managements, underwriters,
attorneys or others who have been connected with debtors, than may be
warranted by the experience of many. Moreover, there is reason to suspect
that a disinterested trustee might not be in as favorable position, and also
might lack the incentives which the former owners or managers would have,
to prepare and press through a plan to completion.60

The tone of these last views of Lashley approaches in tenor Robert
T. Swaine's irate discussion of most of the Protective Committee study

and its reform program. The following is about as kind a passage
as can be found in his analysis.
The two Reports (the main Protective Committee study and one of its
parts, Trustees Under Indentures) contain many fair analyses of abuses
and defects in past reorganization technique and the two Bills contain
many wise provisions directed toward the correction of those abuses and
defects. But the dominant philosophy of the Reports and the dominant
philosophy of the Bills will not produce reorganization procedure which
is "expeditious, economical, fair and honest." 61

Most of Swaine's article is devoted to discussion of "the mistaken
philosophy and scheme of these Bills." 62 He doubted the desirability
or necessity for independent trustees in all large reorganizations and
for restrictions on the membership and composition of protective
committees. He believed that SEC-sponsored provisions of the

latter sort constituted "governmental obstruction of the control by
security-holders

interests...

of

their

own

organization

for

their

mutual

"63

Many of the provisions for SEC intervention were also distasteful

to him, particularly provisions under which the Commission could
advise the court on the desirability of arrangements for management

of the debtor after reorganization. As he saw it this meant that:
A politically constituted administrative bureau, ... , is to have a voice in,
and as a practical matter a veto power over, the determination by the
60. Ibid.
61. Swaine, Democratization of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 CoLUM. L. REv. 256,
278 (1938). The quotation, the reader will recall, comes from the Protective Committee
Report. Swaine, was, of course, a leading figure in the New York financial bar, and
at one time was prepared to offer Douglas a partnership in his firm. Interview With
Dorothy Swaine Thomas, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 29, 1953. Mrs. Thomas, who
is related to Swaine, was later associated with Douglas in research projects at Yale
University.
62. Swaine, supra note 61.
63. Id. at 277.
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security holders of the persons who 64are to manage the security holders'
private business after reorganization.

The essence of Swaine's criticisms was that the Protective Committee study painted a picture too atypical to be valuable as a guide for
general revision of corporate reorganization procedures and that
better results could be attained if one permitted greater flexibility in
the reorganization process. The appointment of an independent
trustee should be left to the discretion of the court. Security holders
should be protected by full disclosure of the interests of their agents
and then left to manage their own affairs. The SEC should offer its
65
expert services only when requested in respect to a particular issue.
Swaine's views do not give us the perspective we seek in regard
to the merits of the reorganization studies. In concluding our
examination of this important part of Douglas' pre-court work, a
better picture can be obtained from the other two participants in
the Columbia Law Review's symposium on the program. Joseph L.
Weiner observed that the material presented in the SEC report was
far from novel. "The factual portions of the Report disclosed little
that students of reorganization have not generally known, and reorganizers taken for granted."6
Weiner also noted that there would be disagreement among those
acquainted with reorganization as to the extent to which the abuses
documented in the study were typical. His evaluation was not far
from that contained in the balanced criticisms made by E. Merrick
Dodd, Jr. On the accuracy of the picture painted by the report, Dodd
observed that:
The impression which it creates in the mind of one reader, at least, is
that the individual case histories which it contains are accurately stated,
but that both the manner in which these cases have been fitted into the
general scheme and the comments which the Commission has made on
the facts which they disclose have the effect of emphasizing the dangers
which inhere in existing reorganization methods and of minimizing both the
advantages which these methods may have and the extent to which those
advantages would be jeopardized by the adoption of the Commission's
reform.
Both Part I and Part II of the report are essentially briefs-fair-minded
and well documented briefs67 to be sure-in support of the Commission's
recommendations for reform.
64. Id. at 277-78.
65. Swaine summarizes his own views as to a desirable program in his article.
Id. at 278-79.
66. Weiner, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Reorganization,
38 CoLUM. L. BEv. 280 (1938).
67. Dodd, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Reform Program for Bankruptcy Reorganization,38 CoLmt. L. REv. 223, 225 (1938).
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Dodd was a professor at Harvard and thus somewhat more detached from the various interests concerned with the reform than
,were many members of the bar. He felt that many of the recommendations that had been made by the Douglas group were needed.
He could understand hesitation about forcing the reorganization court
to appoint an independent trustee in all major cases. Dodd, however,
felt that the real question was not whether it might be possible to
handle some individual reorganizations more easily in other ways.
It is whether the interests of the whole body of American investors are not
best safeguarded by a rule which would compel those corporation officers
and directors who are inclined to ignore their fiduciary obligations to face
the certainty that if reorganization becomes imperative an investigation of
their managerial delinquencies wil inevitably result.68

In Dodd's opinion the case which the SEC made for "drastic"

changes in the protective committee system was "unanswerable." He,
like some others, felt, however, that the SEC remedies perhaps were

too inflexible. He feared that they might discourage most of those
with any motive for participating energetically in the work of the
committees. 69
Weiner also felt that diffculties might arise in implementing some
of the remedies. Although he thought many of the measures "reasonably appropriate" steps to improvement of the reorganization
process, he feared that competent independent trustees might be
hard to find. 0 He also believed that the role of the SEC might be
more limited than was implied in the reform proposals, 71 a view
partially borne out in later study of the operation of chapter X. In
the opinion of one observer, a decade of experience reveals that while
the SEC had probably contributed to unifornity of administration of
the law and reduced blatant violations of the act, its views on the
desirability of reorganization 2plans studied by it had had little effect
on acceptance of those plans.7
V. JUsTICE DOUGLAS' VIEWS ON CORPORATE REORGANIZATION

A review of the Protective Committee Study headed by Douglas
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 229-30.
Id. at 249.
Weiner, supranote 66, at 290.
Id. at 289. For comments supporting the program see also Rodvin, Trustees
Under Indentures-The Old Order Changes in 3 Comu'oaTE REORGANIZATION 223
(1937); Jackson, A Realistic Approach to Amendment of Section 77 B of the National
Bankruptcy Act, in 3 Com,'oa TE RlEoRANzA N 311 (1937); Jackson, The New
Deal in Corporate Reorganization, in 4 CoRPoRATE REORGANiZATO 3 (1937).
72. See Billyou, A Decade of Corporate Reorganization Under Chapter X, 49 CoLum.
L.lRv. 456 (1949).
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shows us a picture of a man who successfully organized study of
complicated relationships in the field of corporate finance, stripping
away the various legal arrangements involved to reveal practices
which, in their functional significance, deeply shocked his sense of
propriety. Having done so, he pushed ahead vigorously and effectively
to have his suggested reforms embodied in law. By the time that
these legal reforms had been enacted, however, the New Deal was
running out of steam on the political front. Douglas, having risen to
the Chairmanship of the SEC through vigorous prosecution of such
programs as the Protective Committee Study, was about to move
into the judicial arena. His nomination as an Associate Justice on
March 20 and confirmation by the Senate on April 4, 1939, brought
him to the Court at a time when cases involving interpretation of the
revised bankruptcy act were just beginning to come before our high
tribunal. Apparently combining his special knowledge of corporate
reorganization with persuasive argument, Douglas was able to gain
unanimous acceptance for his views in many of his early decisions.
Examination of these cases demonstrates the manner in which
Douglas as judge executed the policies developed by Douglas as
administrator. It also provides some additional glimpses of the
functional approach to legal problems.
In Justice Douglas' earlier work for the Securities and Exchange
Commission we saw the emphasis he placed on protection of creditors'
rights in reorganizations. His opinion in Case v. Los Angles Lumber
Products Co. 73 supports that position for a unanimous Court. Handed
down in his first year on the bench, the decision turned around the
conflicting doctrines of "full or absolute priority" or of "relative
priority" as guides in payment of creditors. To grasp the full significance of the Los Angeles Lumber Products decision, we will have to
delve briefly into the background of these theories.
In their arrangements for participation of unsecured creditors and
stockholders, reorganization proposals frequently make the issue of
what constitutes a satisfactory repayment of creditors a matter of
central importance. If the stockholders retain an equity in the corporation when its assets are insufficient to recompense creditors in full,
debts have not been really paid. Schemes for distributing the assets
among various classes of creditors holding differing rights to priority
of payment can raise quite analagous questions. Have those been
adequately recompensed whose money originally purchased claims to
first priority in payment?
By 1930 two main schools of thought had developed regarding
interpretations of what was legally required in such circumstances.
73. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
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One of the major ones was the school of "relative priority" which
held "that the relative priorities of the old securities, senior to the
most junior securities which continue to have any interest in the
property must not be inequitably disturbed." 74
Another theory, the rule of "absolute priority," was said to hold
"that each class of senior securities, starting at the top, must be
given in reorganization new securities having a 'value' ... equal to
its full principal and
interest before anything could be given to the
75
next junior class."

Presumably some rule such as those mentioned above might determine the meaning of provisions in corporate reorganization sections of
the bankruptcy laws which required that plans could not be approved
unless they were "fair and equitable." 76 Douglas played a large
role in attempts to spell out the nature of a "fair and equitable"
reorganization. In the major cases dealing with the problem, Douglas
wrote the Court's opinion three out of four times. With the exception
of the third case, in which Roberts dissented, the new Justice set
forth his views for a unanimous Court. Together these three cases,
embodying a position supported by the SEC,7 7 probably represent
Douglas' most significant addition to interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Act.
On first impression these opinions seemed to place the Court's stamp
of approval upon the "absolute" or "full priority" rule. In Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Douglas' opinion first declared
that the words "fair and equitable" of section 77B were "words of art"
which had acquired a fixed meaning in equity reorganizations and
were intended to embrace the "rule of full or absolute priority"7 8 set
74. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last
Decade, 27 CoLmrJ. L. REV. 901, 907 (1927). Swaine maintains that with the passage
of time this was corrupted into a third theory, the "composition theory," under which
stockholders could continue to participate as long as they sacrificed as much or more
percentage wise as did the creditors. See his article, Swaine, A Decade of Railroad
Reorganization Under Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HARV. L. REy.
1193, 1204-05 (1943), and the works therein cited at 1204 n.92.
75. Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization, supra note 74, at 1204. This is
Swaines interpretation of the rule set forth in a classic article by James C. Bonbright
and Milton M. Bergermann, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in
a CorporateReorganization,28 COLum. L. REv. 127 (1928).
76. Section 77(g) (railroad reorganizations) required the district judge, before
approval, to satisfy himself that the reorganization plan "is equitable and does not
discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders." Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, as amended ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467, 1479 (1933). Section 77B(f)
required satisfaction that "it is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as
in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders.
amended ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 920 (1934).
Its replacement, chapter X, used the term "fair and equitable.
52 Stat. 840
(1938), 11 U.S.C. 616(8) (1958).
77. See 8 REPORT ON PRoTEcTrvE Commilx. 142 ff.
78. 308 U.S. 106, 118 (1939).
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forth in Northern racific Ry. v. Boyd. 9 In this reorganization the
bankruptcy court, although finding that assets of the company were
admittedly less than 900,000 dollars while liabilities exceeded 3,800,000 dollars, had nonetheless approved a plan which allowed stockholder participation in the reorganized company.80 Although the
stockholders contributed no cash as a means of obtaining a new
equity, the lower court reasoned that their participation was permissible because of certain intangible contributions: provision of "conto the plan, abtinuity of management," refraining from opposition
81
like.
the
and
litigation,
extensive
stention from
Quoting from Kansas City Terminal R.R. v. Central Union Trust
Co., Justice Douglas reaffirmed that "to the extent of their debts
creditors are entitled to priority over stockholders against all the
property of an insolvent corporation:"8 2 The considerations purportedly offered by the old stockholders were to be ignored.
Such items are illustrative of a host of intangibles which, if recognized as

adequate consideration for issuance of stock to valueless junior interests,
would serve as easy evasions of the principle ofa full or absolute priority
of Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd and related cases.8

Though the Los Angeles decision gave certain factors new importance in reorganization, their exact significance was not settled until
further decisions had been handed down by the Court. One of these
major issues raised by the opinion was that of value. Valuation of
the property would be of much greater importance if the law clearly
demanded that when they had no remaining equity shareholders
must always be completely barred from sharing in a corporation's
assets. Despite the issue's importance, however, valuation is a rather
complicated problem on which the Los Angeles opinion offered
little guidance.
Even though clarification of such problems awaited the future, the
79. 228 U.S. 482 (1913). Discussion of the rule of the Los Angeles Lumber
Products case is very extensive. For a balanced discussion see Dodd, The Los Angeles
Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implications, 53 HAuv. L. REv. 713, 753
(1940); Note, 34 ILL. L. REv. 589-96 (1940); Note, 25 IowA L. REv. 793-801 (1940);
Note, 49 YALE L.J. 1099-1105 (1940). For a treatment of more recent developments
following from the case consult Billyou, supra note 72; Guthmann, Absolute Priority
in Reorganization: Some Defects in a Supreme Court Doctrine, 45 CoLum. L. REv.
739-54 (1945); Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization, supra note 74, at
1037-58, 1193-1224 (1943).
80. 308 U.S. 106, 119 (1939).
81. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., supra at 112-13.
82. 271 U.S. 445 (1926), quoted at 308 U.S. 106, 120 (1939).
83. 308 U.S. 106, 122. Another early unanimous Douglas opinion concerned with
application of this rule in straightforward fashion among varying classes of creditors
was Marine Harbor Properties v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 317 U.S- 78 (1942).
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Los Angeles case still was of notable significance. One commentator
has observed that it helped "to dissipate much of the fog which theretofore enshrouded reorganization under the federal statutes. "81
In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBoisP decided two years
later, Douglas, again speaking for a unanimous Court, reaffirmed the
position of the Los Angeles case. At the same time he clarified some
of the collateral questions raised by that decision. Here the Justice
indicated that any plan must necessarily be rejected when, like the
one under consideration, it failed to properly evaluate the assets of
two subsidiaries of a holding company. Reorganization contemplated
formation of a new company in which assets of the parent and
subsidiaries would be merged. As Douglas indicated, without proper
valuation two vital problems remained unsolved.
The first problem involved the primary issue growing out of the
Los Angeles doctrine, namely the extent to which the stockholders of
the parent might retain any equity in the new corporation. The plan
had ignored a claim of the subsidiaries against the parent for over
5,000,000 dollars face value. Technical arguments as to inability of
the subsidiaries to press the claim met Douglas' intransigent insistence
on honesty, which he expressed in familiar language.
Equity will not permit a holding company which has dominated and controlled its subsidiaries to escape or reduce its liability to those subsidiaries
by reliance upon self-serving contracts which it has imposed on them. A
holding company, as well as others in dominating or controlling positions,
has fiduciary duties to security holders of its system which will be strictly
enforced.8

The second problem was the impossibility of determining the
fair proportion of participation in the new company for bondholders
84. Billyou, supranote 72, at 497.
85. 312 U.S. 510 (1941). See Douglas' discussion of the significance of this case
in Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. Paul & Pac. Ry., 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
86. 312 U.S. at 522. Another problem related to the participation of shareholders
in the new company was the adequacy of the bondholders' remuneration. Douglas
voiced the Court's objections to the plan on the ground that "the bondholders have not
been made whole. They have received an inferior grade of securities, inferior in the
sense that the interest rate has been reduced, a contingent return has been substituted
for a fixed one, the maturities have been in part extended and in part eliminated by
the substitution of preferred stock, and their former strategic position has been
weakened. Those lost rights are of value. Full compensatory provision must be made
for the entire bundle of rights which the creditors surrender." Id. at 528.
See the same point in Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. Ry.,
supra note 85, at 569-70. Note in this connection, however, Roberts' criticism of
Justice Douglas' summary treatment of the bondholders of a lessor in the Milwaukee
case, id. at 576. In partial justification of Douglas on that point one should observe
that Douglas bases his position in large part on the view that the Court ought not to
reverse the ICC and bankruptcy court where reasonable grounds for their action may
be inferred. Id. at 550-51.
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secured by different portions of the corporate property. Bondholders
of each subsidiary could share in earnings of the new company on a
"fair and equitable" basis only if the value of their present interest
87
was determined.
After dealing with these points Justice Douglas turned to the
related valuation question. For reorganization purposes he held
that the only fair valuation would be a capitalization of prospective
earnings. A sound financial structure would be impossible unless
there was reasonable expectation that interest and dividend requirements of the new securities would be covered. Moreover, the rule
of absolute priority could not be otherwise satisfied for "unless
meticulous regard for earning capacity be had, indefensible participation of junior securities in plans of reorganization may result."88
Evaluation of Douglas' Contribution to the "Full Priority" Doctrine
Just what was the contribution of these two opinions to the field of
reorganization law? How practical and efficient were the tests they
set up? Such considerations come to mind when one examines the
significance of Douglas' legal approach in the field of corporate reorganization.
Early commentators on the Los Angeles and the Consolidated Rock
Products cases took the view that the decisions had firmly established
"the absolute priority" doctrine attributed by Douglas to Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd. 89 In evaluating the two cases it is significant
to note that Justice Douglas' certainty that such a rule was clearly
stated in the Boyd case was not shared by all other readers of that
and related decisions. A good many were of the opinion that prior
cases stood for considerably less. 90 Later observers have concluded
that actually the Los Angeles case, rather than the Boyd case, was
the first instance in which the Court really employed the "absolute
priority concept." 91
Justice Douglas' language was so strong in the Los Angeles and
Consolidated Rock Products cases that we can easily understand why
observers felt that, whatever its antecedents, the rule was now firmly
enthroned. With such a conviction spreading, discussion soon began
to dwell on the difficulties for reorganization which might ensue.
One writer, Harry G. Guthmann, saw numerous disadvantages
stemming from the manner in which stockholders were excluded in
87. Id. at 564-65.
88. Id. at 565-66. See treatment of the same point in Institutional Investors v.
Chicago, Mil., St. Paul & Pac. Ry., supranote 85, at 540.
89. Guthmann, supra note 79, at 739.
90. Dodd, supra note 67, at 719.
91. Billyou, supra note 72, at 482.
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the Los Angeles case. To him it seemed obvious that the purpose of a
reorganization was to retrieve from the debtor's estate additional
assets beyond what could be obtained through mere liquidation together with satisfaction of creditors dollar for dollar until funds
were exhausted. Starting from this premise reorganization assumed
that earning power in a business as a going concern gave it value
beyond what could be obtained through a forced sale.
In the opinion of Guthmann, Justice Douglas recognized the importance of earning power, but neglected the self-evident fact that
much of this earning power was dependent on the continued efforts
of the stockholders' agent, the existing management. "The mere fact
that the contribution of management is intangible is no argument
that it is in any way unreal."92 This point undoubtedly has merit in
some cases. Douglas, however, apparently chose to lay more stress on
the possible advantages coming from removal of the management that
had led the business to misfortune.
Guthmann also pointed to the problem of how one determines
when the value of a business has sunk so low that the existing stockholders have lost their equity in the property.93 This issue has been
almost universally recognized as of central importance to a rigid
application of the "absolute priority doctrine." Guthmann felt that
valuations in instances such as this were much less certain than an
isolated reading of the two cases under discussion might lead one to
think. Another writer, Blum, points out that once market value is
abandoned as a standard the valuation process inevitably becomes
an exercise in judgment. Even when conducted on the most informed
basis, expert opinions as to reorganization value still are likely to
vary considerably. Three separate guesses are required in any valuation capitalizing prospective earnings, the procedure Justice Douglas
and most others have approved of. First one must estimate what
the average annual future earnings of the business are likely to be.
Then one must determine how long a life the reorganized company
can be expected to have. Finally one must decide upon an appropriate rate of return at which to capitalize the estimated earnings.94
The possibility of error is illustrated by the fact that the SEC, up to
1949, significantly underestimated the actual earnings realized by the
businesses in whose reorganizations it had participated under chap95
ter X.
92. Guthmann, supra note 79, at 742.
93. Guthmann, supra note 79, at 744-45. See Billyou, supra note 72, at 498; Swalne,
A Decade of Railroad Reorganization, supra note 74, at 1205; see generally, Blum,
The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 565 (1950).
94. Blum, supra note 93, at 573-75. See also Guthmann, supra note 79, at 744-45.
95. Billyou, supra note 72, at 499.
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Because of such uncertainties, Douglas had already begun to add
qualifications to his doctrine by the time he restated it in the Consolidated Rock Products case. Discussing the manner of awarding
full compensation to senior claimants he urged that:
Practical adjustments, rather than a rigid formula, are necessary. The
method of effecting full compensation for senior claimants will vary from
case to case.... The creditors are entitled to have the full value of the
property, whether present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes
of control, first appropriated to payment of their claims. But whether in

case of a solvent company the creditors should be made whole for the
change in or loss of their seniority by an increased participation in assets,

thereof, will be dependent
in earnings or in control, or in any combination
96
on the facts and requirements of each case.

Such qualifications in this and later opinions, together with the
passage of time, led the reorganization bar to the conclusion that "the
full priority" rule had considerable flexibility to it. Looking back,
Robert T. Swaine noted that the Los Angeles and Consolidated Rock
Products cases had been extreme situations. In those cases the disparity between the claims of senior creditors and their compensation
was so great that any participation of the old stockholders could be
considered quite unreasonable. The decisions merely established
"the invalidity of the composition theory in the ordinary industrial
reorganization." 97 But this still left a wide field in which the freedom
of action available to the reorganizer had not yet been determined
by the Court. As Swaine saw it: "A denial that reorganization could
validly disregard all factors of valuation, aggregate and relative, was
not a requirement of precise dollar valuations." 98
Justitce Douglas' opinion in the Milwaukee case, decided in 1943,
added still more to the flexibility sanctioned by the Court in redistributing corporate assets. He elaborated on the impossibility of
attaining certainty in valuation proceedings, making it clear that
the Court would demand only a judgment based on the best available data. He held that a plan approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (approval required in railroad reorganizations
carried out under section 77) need not embody a "precise finding
as to the value of the road" in order for the Commission to determine
that the old stockholders had no equity remaining. 9 In distributing
the new securities it was not necessary to interpret requirements
that groups of senior security holders be given "the equitable equivalent" of what they surrender so as to require a valuation of those
96.
97.
98.
99.

Consolidated Rock Products v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 529 (1941).
Swaine, A Decade of RailroadReorganization, supranote 74, at 1205.
Id. at 1207.
318 U.S. 523, 529. With the companion decision in Ecker v. Western Pacific
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securities and of the holders' sacrifices in terms of dollars and cents.
A requirement that dollar values be placed on what each security holder
surrenders and on what he receives would create an illusion of certainty
where none exists and would place an impracticable burden on the whole
reorganization process. 100

These opinions, taken as a whole, eliminated flagrant disregard

of the dominant claims of senior creditors. Interestingly, however,
those creditors proved unwilling, in many cases, to demand the full
measure of what Douglas was willing to grant them. De Forest
Billyou notes that in cases where the SEC has expressed doubts that
the plans were "fair and equitable" there has been no appeal by
senior creditors from approval of the schemes involved.
This silent acceptance of dubious plans is significant and may, perhaps be
used as stark evidence that creditors, at least when organized and represented in the manner permitted by Chapter X, are content with something
far less than even "the full priority rule of Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Boyd."10

The "absolute priority rule" had become, perhaps, as Swaine suggested, something "positional or comparative-i.e., relative." 0 2
A brief examination of a number of other bankruptcy cases is of
interest in order to amplify Justice Douglas' view that the great
powers of the bankruptcy and reorganization courts are intended to
R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943), and the denial of certiorari by the Court in Chicago and
Northwestern Ry. v. Mutual Savings Bank Group Committee, 318 U.S. 793 (1943),
the Milwaukee reorganization case provided "the first comprehensive review of
Section 77." Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization, supra note 74, at 1037.
100. 318 U.S. at 565. The reader may wish to consider the possibility that Douglas'
shift in position here was influenced in part not merely by considerations of problems
in administering the bankruptcy laws, but also by the desirability of respect for the
decisions of regulatory commissions. Such a viewpoint would be natural in a former
Chairman of the SEC, and is stated strongly in one of Douglas' most significant
opinions, Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
101. Billyou, supra note 72, at 487. In railroad reorganizations they have become
content with even less, a composition statute having been adopted more recently which
has eliminated most railroad reorganization proceedings under section 77. See Polatsek,
The Wreck of the Old 77, 34 CoRNm.L L.Q. 532 (1949).
102. Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization, supra note 74, at 1209. Following somewhat the same vein as that in the cases discussed above, Douglas, in another
group of opinions, insists upon adequate compensation of senior rights. These decisions
bring out his rather general dislike of special preferences in any form when the issue
is that of distribution of assets in bankruptcy, whether the claimant of special consideration represents labor, an insurance company, or even a state government. See
Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952) (Black and Jackson, J., dissenting); Gardner
v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565 (1947); American Surety Co. v. Bethlehem National
Bank, 314 U.S. 314 (1941) (Douglas and Black, J., dissenting). The conditions under
which he felt a special preference might be justified are indicated by Douglas in Mason
v. Paradise Irrigation District, 326 U.S. 536 (1946).
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fulfill certain important functions: preventing debtors from being
paralyzed by the burden of their obligations; protecting creditors
and investors generally in as full a measure as possible; exacting
retribution for dishonesty, unconscionable conduct, and secret manipu10 3
lations on the part of insiders.
In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co.,1' 4 decided
in 1943, Justice Roberts' majority opinion suggested that provisions
authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine reimbursable expenses were constitutional only because review by the
courts was not precluded. Douglas felt that exercise of careful control over such allowance, the sort of control an administrative agency
like the ICC could provide, was in keeping with his feeling that
reorganization profiteering should be prevented. He did not believe
that the courts had legal authority to review the ICC's approval of
these allowances, nor did he feel that the lack of review made the
provision unconstitutional. In discussing the question he took advantage of the occasion to indicate the broad authority he believed Congress possessed under the bankruptcy power of the Constitution.
It is Congress which has the power under the Constitution to establish
"uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United

States." The scope of the bankruptcy power is not restricted to that
which has been exercised. The fact that Congress has customarily entrusted

administration of the various bankruptcy acts to the courts does not mean
that it must do so ....

When it comes to fees for services rendered or

expenses incurred in connection with bankruptcy proceedings, Congress has
plenary power. .

. . It could provide that no fees for services rendered
during the bankruptcy proceedings might be paid from the estate.105

On other occasions Justice Douglas indicated that he believed
this plenary power over bankruptcy exercisable by Congress is
necessarily so great that it might prove a significant barrier to state
independence of action in other fields. It could prevent a state
from adversely interpreting a corporation's charter so as to thwart
acceptance of a reorganization plan on the one hand,'06 or force
serious modification of a state's power to collect taxes owed it by a
debtor whose estate was under the supervision of the bankruptcy
court. He spoke of "the arsenal of authority granted the reorganization court"' 1 7 (a characteristically functional approach), empha103. These were all concerns on which Douglas had expressed himself as far back
as the Bankruptcy Studies at Yale. See my discussion in The Influence of Legal Realism
on William 0. Douglas, supra note 3, at 73-75, and Douglas' works there cited.
104. 318 U.S. 163 (1943).
105. 318 U.S. at 175. See support for this position in Note, 56 HAv. L. REv. 1156,

1160 (1943).

106. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
107. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 579 (1947). In another case a somewhat
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sizing that its purpose included "the compromise or settlement of
claims, so that interminable litigation might be ended and the
interests of expedition in promulgating a plan of reorganization
served." 108 Those purposes had led to broad definitions of jurisdiction.
Creditors, for example, include "all holders of claims of whatever
character against the debtor or its property ....-109 and could comprehend a state seeking payment of back taxes owed it by the railroad.
From an examination of Anderson v. Abbott"' we are able to
clarify Justice Douglas' views as to how the Court should act in
implementing congressional regulation of bankruptcy. In this case
the late Justice Jackson, sharply dissenting, accused Justice Douglas
and his majority colleagues of injecting the Court into the realm of
legislation.
The litigation concerned Banco Kentucky, which had been established as a holding company to effect a merger of various banks.
Upon failure of the merged banks, their stockholders were subject
to an assessment in accordance with double liability provisions of
the bank stocks. While the entire Court agreed that those shareholders of Banco who had transferred bank shares to it could be held
liable,"' the minority felt that Justice Douglas and his colleagues
went too far in holding that purchasers of Banco stock for cash
were also liable for an assessment." 2
Justice Douglas' approach is interesting because of its reliance on
an examination of the functional realities which he saw in the
financial arrangements with which the case was concerned. Applying
such analysis, the Justice thought it clear that old stockholders
retained their former investment position and control of the bank,
while the new company did not provide an adequate financial substitute for their previous liability. Therefore, the Court should impose
liability upon them.
The Justice also insisted on holding cash purchasers of Banco
stock liable, again by reasoning as to the functions performed and
performable by Banco. All but a small portion of Banco's holdings
were double liability bank stocks and that small remainder was of
similar holding was used to answer non-participating stockholders who brandished a
bondholder agreement not to foreclose. Justice Douglas there held that the bankruptcy
court cannot allow itself to be bound by such previous contracts of the parties
involved. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 126-29 (1939).
108. Id. at 581.
109. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935).
110. 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
111. Justice Jackson, however, felt that liability for bank shareholders could only
be established on a different principle than Justice Douglas employed, and after
examining evidence on the point. Id. at 369-72.
112. Id. at 372.
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dubious value. For all practical purposes, then, Banco held nothing
but double liability bank shares.
The device used here can be so readily utilized in circumvention of the
statutory policy of double liability that the stockholders of the holding
company rather than the depositors of the subsidiary
banks must take the
113
risk of the financial success of the undertaking.

To Justice Douglas, public policy was clearly one of the reasons
why liability had to be extended to cash purchasers of Banco shares.
"To allow this holding company device to succeed would be to put
4
the policy of double liability at the mercy of corporation finance.""
Finally, answering those who might accuse him of judicial activism,
Justice Douglas argued that there was a clear congressional purpose
to maintain double liability on bank stocks and declared:
judicial power hardly oversteps the bounds when it refuses to lend its aid
to a promotional project which would circumvent or undermine a legislative
policy... If the judicial power is helpless to protect a legislative program
from schemes for easy avoidance, then indeed it has become a handy
implement of high finance."15

This last quotation reveals how concentration on the functions
actually being carried out by particular practices is used by Justice
Douglas to support judicial action which he believes necessary to
further desirable public policy. Legislative programs, he here suggests, may require the Court to shape and supplement policy in a
vigorous fashion if the programs are not to become mere lifeless shells.
When Douglas turns to the issue of the scope of relief afforded
debtors by the Bankruptcy Act, we find him using the same approach.
He argues strongly for policies which he believes are needed to
preserve the spirit of congressional legislation. Justice Douglas has
long emphasized that provision of relief to debtors was one of the
main functions which the broad powers of the bankruptcy comt
should serve." 6 Part of his individualism would seem to be a view
that Americans ought not to have their initiative excessively stifled
by a heavy burden of debt.
This principle Douglas expressed for a unanimous Court in Wright
v. Central Life Insurance Co.," 7 decided early in his judicial career.
There a conflict had arisen between two provisions of the second
Frazier-Lemke Act, a depression-born law intended to provide special
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 359.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 366.
See Douglas, Bankruptcy, 1 ENCYc. Soc. Sci. 449 (1930).

117. 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
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relief for fanner debtors. Justice Douglas, resorting to a pattern of
analysis typical for him, pointed to the purpose and function which
he felt the act was intended to fulfill. He believed that where these

were kept in mind the conflict could be easily resolved.
This act provided a procedure to effectuate a broad program of rehabilitation of distressed farmers faced with the disaster of forced sales and an
oppressive burden of debt." 8

So long as the creditor's rights were protected to the extent of the
value of the property it
certainly is in no position to insist that doubts or ambiguities in the Act
be resolved in its favor and against the debtor. Rather, the Act must be
liberally construed to give the debtor the full measure of the relief
afforded by Congress, lest its benefits be frittered away by narrow formalistic interpretations which disregard the spirit and the letter of the Act.119

In several instances involving this particular issue of liberal relief
to debtors Justice Douglas was unable to convince the majority of

the Court and found himself in dissent. An interesting illustration is
provided by the case of Reitz v. Mealey, 20 decided a year after the
Wright case just discussed. Here bankruptcy collided with state
efforts to control negligent motorists, a conflict which Douglas

had noted as early as 1930.121 A New York financial responsibility
law provided for suspension of the operators license of any person
who had not, within fifteen days, satisfied any judgment against him
"for injury to person or property resulting from operation of a motor
car." Discharge from bankruptcy was declared not to satisfy such
judgments. Amendments suspended operation of the statute unless

requested by the creditor holding the unsatisfied judgment. Reitz
had his chauffeur's license suspended, although he was discharged
from the debt in bankruptcy proceedings. Justice Owen Roberts and

four associates upheld the law, pointing out that this could be viewed
118. Id. at 278. For discussion of this and earlier cases see Note, 35 ILL. L. RBy.
878-82 (1941).
119. 311 U.S. at 278-79.
120. 314 U.S. 33 (1941). Justice Black joined Justice Douglas in this dissent
(together with Byrnes and Jackson), as he did in two other cases: Union Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Byerly, 310 U.S. 1 (1940), a joint dissent with Murphy where the trio
wished to allow a farmer more liberal relief under the Frazier-Lemke Act than the
majority granted, and Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447
(1943), where the majority denied access to the bankruptcy court, on the basis of
a state law prohibiting it, for the executor of the estate of a deceased farmer. Significant support for the dissenters in the Byerly case is to be found in Note, 53 HAnv. L.
REv. 1388-89 (1940); and for the Douglas position in the Harris case in Note, 43
COLUmn. L. REv. 516-20 (1943).
121. See Douglas, Automobile Insurance,1 ENcYc. Soc. Sc. 330-32 (1930); Douglas,
supranote 5, at 342-43.
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as an exercise of the police power by the state. As such they felt it
to be a justifiable scheme for enforcing greater care upon motorists
and protecting the residents of the state from possible injury by
irresponsible motorists. Justice Roberts replied to the contention
that the amendments transformed this into a scheme for collecting
debts with the observation that, if the amendments fell, Reitz would
be just as badly off, since the statute would remain without the
discretionary suspension.' 22 Douglas felt that "unless we are to overlook the realities of collection methods" it was impossible to avoid a
finding that the law contravenes the constitutional bankruptcy
powers."m His views are interesting both for the expression of his
values on the point, and as an illustration of the functional approach.
Under the New York scheme a creditor whose claim has been discharged
still holds a club over his debtor's head. The state has given him a remedy
which survives bankruptcy. If the bankrupt refuses to pay his discharged
debt, the creditor will see to it that his driver's license is suspended. If,
however, the bankrupt will pay up, the creditor will refrain.
The practical pressures of this collection device are apparent. Where
retention of the operator's license is essential to livelihood, as here alleged,
the bankrupt is at the creditor's mercy. Bankruptcy is not then the
sanctuary for hapless debtors which Congress intended.124

One final Douglas opinion, though not of great length or vital
significance, deserves attention as an effort to establish a new precedent, seeking a more realistic position and elimination of ethereal
judicial speculation through use of the functional approach. In reorganization proceedings for the New Haven Railroad a question
arose as to the value of a claim for damages resulting from the
disallowance of a 999 year lease on certain traction properties.
Justice Stanley Reed, for the majority, held that the only way to
establish damages was to determine them for a given, relatively
short term of years, and to assume no further damages provableltm
Justice Frankfurter, in one dissent, argued that the Court could not
assume that the bankruptcy law intended courts to refrain from
receiving proof of damages for the 969 year remainder of the term
of the lease. 12
122. 314 U.S. at 39-40. Concerning this last argument of the majority Note, 55
HAv. L. REv. 677-78 (1941), is instructive. It is there pointed out that by such

reasoning it becomes impossible to ever challenge the validity of the amendments.
Discussion is also strongly critical of the majority in Note, 39 MicH. L. REv. 645-48
(1941).
123. 314 U.S. at 43. In his earlier scholarly examination of the functions of the
Bankruptcy Act Justice Douglas had concluded that some remedy was needed for the
problem of financial irresponsibility among motorists but that none was then available
and a remedy would have to wait upon action by Congress. See Douglas, supra note 5.
124. 314 U.S. at 41.
125. Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544, 557 (1941).
126. Id. at 562-63.
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Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, attempted to reduce
ethereal speculation by a third solution seeming to bear within it the
essence of practicality.
It is plain that any attempted computation of future rental values of this

property for the next 969 years would at best be a mere flight "into the
realm of pure speculation".... From our point in history 969 years hence
is perpetuity. It covers a longer span than from 1941 A.D. to 500 years
before Columbus discovered America. To project past earnings of a
present enterprise through such vicissitudes of time would be to assume
a static quality in society which even a decade of history would disprove.12 7

Justice Douglas then suggested that the following simple, realistic
approach be adopted.
[To] call something a 999 year lease doesn't make it a lease. For all
practical purposes it is ownership. Therefore the present value of the lease
is no more or less than the value of the property. Have it appraised and
be done with speculation. 2 8
VI. CONCLUSION

William 0. Douglas' major contributions to the field of bankruptcy law are marked by a high degree of continuity in approach
and in solutions. An attitude of uncompromising insistence on the
payment of obligations was reflected in the Protective Committee
studies and carried over to the Justice's statements in Los Angeles
Lumber Products and subsequent cases. This approach is tempered
only by the Justice's additional conviction, seen here in Reitz v.
Mealey, that one of the great purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to
relieve individuals of a crushing burden of debt.
On the Court we see the Justice's firm position on the rights of
creditors carried far enough to earn him substantial credit for the
establishment of a new doctrine, that of "absolute priority" of senior
creditors' claims in reorganization settlements. We have noted that
this doctrine proved to be difficult of rigid application and, in final
interpretation, was somewhat more flexible than might be thought
at first glance.
In both his administrative studies and his Court discussions of
bankruptcy problems we find Douglas focusing his attention regularly on what he sees to be the actual economic practices being
carried out through the legal machinery involved. In the Banco
Kentucky case he goes far in judicial interpretation of legislative
intent, so as to thwart a scheme which could have all too easily
127. Id. at 564-65.
128. Id. at 567-68.
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defeated the congressional purpose as he saw it. The same desire to
strip practices down to their functional bones created doubts within
himself as he looked at New York's automotive financial responsibility
law and subsequently led to an unorthodox but attractively uncomplicated approach to valuation in regard to the New Haven Railroad's traction properties.
Douglas' energetic attack on the economic problems of bankruptcy
and his pronounced skill in portraying their significance in functional
terms resulted in many of his proposed solutions becoming the law
of the land through the Trust Indentures Act and chapter X of the
Chandler Bankruptcy Act. When Douglas moved to the Court he
attained notable success, no doubt in large part because of his background, in shaping the law of bankruptcy from the judicial side as
well. Certainly, if the functional movement in the law were seeking
advertisement for success, it could ask for no more persuasive record
than that of its exponent, Justice Douglas, in the field of bankruptcy
and corporate reorganization.

